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BOOK REVIEWS
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CON-
SEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. By Rolf F. Sannwald and
Jaques Stohler. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp.
xvi, 260. $5.00.
There is an interesting divergence between the actual development
of, and the theories of economists on, economic integration. In Western
Europe, the new institutions of economic integration sprang from the
power oriented goals of national economies. In economic theory, how-
ever, these efforts at integration are analysed in terms of pure economies
and ideal goals. These aims are maximum economic welfare or com-
pletely equal treatment of all participants in exchange of goods. The re-
sult of this divergence is that economists do not come to grips with the
economic consequences of the power oriented forms of economic inte-
gration.
The European Coal and Steel Community resulted from a peculiar
power constellation that grew out of World War II. The victorious
Allies had imposed unilaterally the International Ruhr Authority through
the use of which they controlled the German heavy industries. While
France consistently tried to keep this control out of German hands, the
United States exerted pressure for a German rearmament in response to
the Korean War. Shift in American policy provided an opening for the
German government to terminate the unilateral control. Adenauer was
the first among the powerful who proposed a supra-national "organism
which would embrace the basic industries of the other European countries
as well."' The ball was picked up by Schuman who succeeded in obtain-
ing a High Authority that was to permit an increase in German steel pro-
duction without giving West Germany the opportunity to increase there-
by its political and military power.
The Common Market has been equally a product of power politics.
Its ultimate origin lay in the Russian threat to Western Europe. A com-
promise between France and West Germany constituted the immediate
origin. The Adenauer government was willing to accept Euratom with
its monopoly of knowledge, skills and products. Under joint Allied pres-
sure, Adenauer accepted also the German renunciation of manufacturing
atomic weapons. In return for these concessions Germany succeeded in
getting the new organization of the Common Market accepted by France.
1. DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION 1945-54 at 419 (1955) ed. by B.
Ruhm von Oppen.
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Enjoying modern plants and lower unit costs, German steel concerns not
only desired ready access to the product markets of the other member
countries but also sought a reliable supply of North African ore and
other investment opportunities. The French demand that the colonial
territories be associated with the Common Market and that each mem-
ber contribute a certain sum to a development fund, became thus accept-
able to West Germany.'
All three supra-national institutions dealing with steel and coal,
atomic -energy, and with the Common Market, thus generated from the
power politics of national states. In addition to their economic signifi-
cance, the respective treaties were signed in the expectation that France
would gain politically and West Germany economically from the opera-
tion of these international institutions. The same power politics has also
been responsible for the fact that Western Europe has become divided
into sixes and sevens. The immediate goals of the French-German al-
liance are thus endangering the ultimate goal of increased strength for
Western Europe relative to the Soviet Union.
Rather than analyzing the various national economies and ascertain-
ing the allocational effects of their power goals, many economists ex-
amine the economic consequences of the supra-national institutions in
terms of an ideal economy. One line of thought concentrates upon eco-
nomic integration which is defined ideally as "the realization of the old
Western ideal of equality of opportunity."'  It is implied that the na-
tional economies have or will become welfare states. The international
treaties are thus evaluated as either adequate or inadequate instruments
for extending equal opportunities and economic equality to all the mem-
ber states. Another line of thought applies the current theory of
international tradc to the international institutions. Their economic
actions are examined in terms of maximum economic welfare and equal
treatment of all traders. It is usually asserted that the tariff reductions
and quota eliminations of an economic union involve necessarily discrim-
ination for third parties.4 The usual inference is that regional integra-
tion of national industries or economies are quasi-monopoly structures
that lead to monopoly-like profits for the member states and thus to a
reduction of the gains from trade for other countries.
The authors of the book under review seek a reconciliation of these
two strands of economic analysis. This involves a twofold task. Eco-
2. Cf. E. STRAUS, COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE COMMON MARKET 62-71, 83-91
(1958).
3. GuNNAR MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 11 (London 1956).
4. For the most elaborate treatment of this discrimination argument see J.E. MEADE,
THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (Amsterdam 1955).
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nomic integration is seen not only negatively as a removal of trade re-
strictions but also as a method of unifying national currency and tax sys-
tems, and of providing an opportunity for intra-union mobility of labor
and capital. The analysis of this enlarged set of problems proceeds in
terms of free trade and welfare theories. Yet the hope is that by reveal-
ing the underlying assumptions and by replacing them by observable
facts, via a sequence of increasingly realistic models, it will be possible to
arrive at a unified theory of economic integration. The expectation is
that a successful handling of these tasks will show that regional integra-
tion will necessarily bring gains that exceed the losses involved for third
parties. Did the authors succeed in realizing their goal?
The analysis begins with the theory of universal free trade, which
is attained either by optimization of trade or by maximization of produc-
tion. Yet such a situation in which no further benefits can be derived
from either an increase in trade or an increase in production hinges upon
the two assumptions that income is already equally distributed and that
the supply of factors cannot be further increased. When these two con-
ditions are not present, a country can benefit from imposing tariffs and
increasing its volume of production. Infant industries, rigidity of prices
and wages as well as involuntary unemployment or internal economies,
furnish additional reasons for trade restrictions. These restrictions im-
pose limitations upon free trade and some of them bring net gains for
the countries involved, while most financial and direct controls create a
benefit for one country only that gains at the expense of other countries.
Free trade is thus politically difficult to attain but economically the best
means for increasing the standard of living for all countries concerned.
What are the advantages of a regionally free trade? Using the dis-
tinction that a customs union creates as well as diverts trade, the authors
do not accept the thesis that the losses of a diversion are necessarily
greater than the gains from a creation of trade. An economic union will
lead to an expansion of trade because of the reduced trade barriers. Eco-
nomic welfare will be increased, via the union, if the original tariffs
were very high, if the integrated economies become complementary to
each other, if the area of the union is large relative to the outside world,
if the removed barriers took the form of quantitative restrictions, if the
advantages of mass production can be realized because of the union, if
the discriminatory measures of the union can be minimized by appro-
priate counteractions.
The comparison between universal and regional free trade leads the
authors to the conclusion that economically the former is the best, the
latter the second best, solution of the international trade problem. Po-
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litically, however, the regional solution is attainable while world-wide
free trade is not. The method of comparing hypothetical models with
each other has thus produced the result of defining more concretely the
desired goal: free trade within the region to be integrated. At this point,
however, the method of successive approximation is abandoned. No at-
tempt is made to define the typical features of a modern national econ-
omy and compare them with the ideal of a regionally free trade area.
Only an analysis of the typical national economy would provide the op-
portunity to discover whether the various forms of European integration
really aimed at regionally free trade, and whether they did adopt the
correct means for achieving such a goal.
Suffering from a decisive gap in their theory, the authors are then
ill equipped to examine the methods that should be adopted to achieve in-
tegration. If the goal is to attain regionally free trade, an economic union
would then have to adopt the whole program of neo-Liberalism. Eco-
nomic welfare by free trade would require abolition of all trade restric-
tions, a common currency based upon a modified gold standard, a free
foreign exchange market linked with readily adjustable rates of ex-
change, a unified banking system, flexible prices and costs in all parts of
the union, full regional mobility of workers and capital, a coordinated
system of taxation, an effective antitrust policy, and a full employment
policy for the whole region. Application of these methods would thus
call only for an investigation of the timing and sequence according to
which the various policies should be introduced.
Rather than accepting this program of neo-Liberalism, the authors
prefer the institutional method for attaining economic union. This meth-
od is not limited to removal of trade restrictions but regards the policies
of national economies since World War I as irreversible. Viewing these
national policies as falling all under the heading of economic welfare, the
rule is laid down that the benefits of such policies must be extended to all
members of the union. Internationalization of such national benefits
calls for rearranging old and for creating new economic institutions.
Without further investigation, the authors take it for granted that the
objective of institutional innovation is "to equalize welfare in the West
European countries." This goal induces them to propose the establish-
ment of an European investment bank and a central organ of economic
policy for the union. The creation of unified but stable regional markets
is to be achieved not only by trade liberalization but also by a market
regulating body and by the exclusion of monopolistic practices. This
new pattern of institutions must be given a permanent character and must
thus be safeguarded against sudden changes by member states.
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In analyzing the specific form and functions of the new institutions,
the authors largely drop their institutional method. In their long chapter
on monetary stability, for instance, they "search for the optimum cur-
rency policy" in the fashion of neo-Liberalism. The question is thus no
longer what institutional changes are feasible and practicable in a reason-
able period of transition. The institutions desired must now pass the test
of optimum efficiency of an ideal economy. In the monetary field the
authors thus suggest the need for a common currency, for a regional
banking system based upon 100 percent reserves, for a supranational
authority of financial policy, and for a single import authority. If such
"optimum" institutions are politically not acceptable, the authors propose
as their second policy a system of variable exchange rates for maintain-
ing monetary equilibrium of the union, internally and externally.
Yet even this alternative policy requires for its effectiveness a set of
supranational institutions that assure harmonization of wage policies
among the member states and protect the national currencies against de-
stabilizing speculation. Such protection calls for a European Monetary
Fund which is welcomed as a forerunner of a common currency. The
system of flexible rates and free exchange markets is thus not expected
to operate by itself but these markets are in need of supranational inter-
vention. Both proposed policies of monetary stabilization thus call for
new regional institutions that are hardly acceptable to the states domi-
nating the common market.
Having first argued against and then accepted the position of neo-
Liberalism, the authors regard the present integration efforts with great
misgivings. They conclude their study with the usual remarks of despair
"that the development of the Economic Union will follow a course simi-
lar to that of the national integration of feudalist countries in the nine-
teenth century." Yet this disappointment is a product of a self-produced
illusion that springs from theorizing in terms of an ideal economy. Per-
fect competition should not be mistaken for economic democracy. Eco-
nomic unions must then either have all the optimum institutions of a per-
fect union, or any less perfect form of economic integration is not worth
having. These illusions and the subsequent despair can be overcome only
if economists leave the wonderland of an unattainable perfect economy,
develop a theory of the capitalist national economy and propose those in-
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stitutional economic changes that are compatible with the simultaneously
existing profit and power goals. Such a theory only will be useful for
politicians, administrators and lawyers who see it as their task to make
European capitalism more viable through a common market.
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